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Abstract 
“The standard explanation of why advanced Europe has generated less work per adult than 
the US is that something is seriously amiss with EU labor markets. The theme of this piece is 
simple. Compared to an ideal competitive market, EU labor markets fall seriously short, but 
compared to labor markets in the US and to other markets in advanced capitalist countries, 
EU labor markets do not live up to their awful press. The variety of labor market institutions 
among EU countries, moreover, reveals a much richer picture of performance and diversity 
than the blanket condemnation of inflexibility suggests. I make my case in four propositions, 
with supporting evidence. My comparisons are with the actual labor market in the US and 
with other real world markets, not with the economists’ dream ideal competitive markets. I 
review briefly the evidence that labor markets in the EU have performed worse on the 
quantity side of the market but better on the price or wage side of the market than the US 
labor market, then consider the extent to which differences in outcomes are attributable to 
differences in the performance of labor markets.” 
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 1
Introduction 
 
“It’s the job market, stupid.”1 
 
Few European institutions have had the bad press given to the labor market.  The standard 
explanation of why advanced Europe has generated less work per adult than the US is that 
something is seriously amiss with EU labor markets.  Labor institutions are inflexible.  
Institutional wage interventions have reduced incentives.  Social benefits are too high. 
Employment protection legislation is too strong.  Mobility is too low.  If only the EU could 
magically transform its labor market into ... the US market, it could do so much better. 
 Why the EU might be able to mimic the US record of ... three decades of declining 
real wages for average workers ... third world levels of inequality ...  a jobless recovery in the 
early 2000s ...  declining provision of health insurance for workers ... short vacations and 
increasing hours worked ... full-time employment by mothers with children less than one year 
old ... 
 Yes, EU labor markets suck compared to the perfect Invisible Hand market of 
economic theory.  But so does the US labor market.  The EU labor market fails on the 
quantity side of the market in the volume of employment created for those who seek work.  
The US labor market fails on the price side of the market in the pay for those who work and 
economic security for those who do not.  
 Like virtually every other economic institution created by humankind, labor markets 
are imperfect.  Whether labor markets are more or less imperfect than, say financial markets, 
with their excessive volatility of share prices, panics and manias etc; or than international 
trade and capital markets, with their sluggish response of prices to exchange rates, currency 
crises, wild flights of private capital, etc is debatable. 
 The theme of this piece is simple.  Compared to an ideal competitive market, EU 
labor markets fall seriously short, but compared to labor markets in the US and to other 
markets in advanced capitalist countries, EU labor markets do not live up to their awful press. 
EU labor markets can be improved, but so too can financial markets, corporate governance, 
business regulation, conditions for the formation of new businesses and bankruptcy laws, the 
efficiency of the EU Commission, and the operation of the EU Central Bank.  The variety of 
labor market institutions among EU countries, moreover, reveals a much richer picture of 
performance and diversity than the blanket condemnation of inflexibility suggests.  
 I make my case in four propositions, with supporting evidence.  My comparisons are 
with the actual labor market in the US and with other real world markets, not with the 
economists’ dream ideal competitive markets.  I review briefly the evidence that labor 
markets in the EU have performed worse on the quantity side of the market but better on the 
price or wage side of the market than the US labor market, then consider the extent to which 
differences in outcomes are attributable to differences in the performance of labor markets .  
 
 
1.  Differing Labor Market Outcomes 
 
Until the 1970s EU countries had lower unemployment rates than the US and similar or 
higher hours of work.  Productivity growth exceeded that in the US as Europe recovered from 
                                                 
1 This paraphrases, “it’s the economy, stupid” that Clinton used to focus his first campaign.  
The parallel phrase “it’s the stupid economists” is associated with the Bush administration. 
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World War II.  EU countries managed this performance with a set of labor and social welfare 
state institutions that included significant reliance on collective bargaining and administrative 
determination of labor market outcomes.  One of my European friends used to say that during 
this period, he could never lecture on the virtue of competitive labor markets without feeling 
as if he was talking theology. 
 In the past three decades, there is no theology in arguing the virtue of competitive 
labor markets in generating employment.  The facts are clear.   Employment-population rates 
in the US, with its less regulated and institutionalized labor market, rose compared to 
employment-population rates in the EU.  The rate of unemployment in the EU has exceeded 
the rate in the US for over a decade, while hours worked in the EU fell sharply relative to US 
levels.  Figure 1 shows the rising divergence in hours worked per adult in the US and EU 
from 1970 to the present.  In 2002, American adults averaged 20% more hours worked over 
the year than Europeans.  About half of the divergence comes in the form of higher 
employment-population rates in the US and about half in the form of greater hours worked 
per employee, with much of that associated with the smaller vacation time that Americans 
have compared to Europeans. 
 Labor utilization differs among demographic groups.  As Table 1 shows, there are no 
differences between the EU and US in employment rates for men aged 25-54.  The 
differences are among younger and older men and among women.  In part, the difference 
among younger persons reflects the greater tendency for US students to work part-time or 
over summers compared to European students, but in part it also reflects the lengthy time it 
takes to obtain a first job in the EU.  Among older persons, the difference is associated with 
early retirement, which has grown more rapidly in the EU than in the US.  The sizable 
difference in employment rates among women is mirrored by a large difference in hours 
worked, as American women, including those with young children, tend to work full-time 
compared to European women.  
 Ronald Schettkat and I have shown that much of the difference in women working has 
to do with the differential marketization of household work in the US and in the EU.  US 
families rely on the market for the production of many traditional household activities, such 
as child care, preparation of food, and house-cleaning to a greater extent than Europeans. 
European women report many more hours of household work than American men.  German 
women, in particular, work almost identical hours to American women, only they do more of 
their work in the household.2 
 Would the EU be better off if it had higher market employment?  If one puts any 
stock in responses of not employed persons to questions about job search, the answer is yes.  
Would the EU be better off if it had longer working hours and limited vacations?  If one puts 
any stock in the responses of Europeans to questions about time worked3, the answer is no. 
 On price side, the situation looks quite different.  Real wages in the EU have risen for 
virtually all workers in the past thirty years while they have stagnated or fallen for large 
numbers of American workers.  The particulars of change for the Americans depends on the 
survey, the measure of earnings, the quality of the price deflator used to turn nominal pay into 
real earnings and the like, but there is no gainsaying that employed Americans have not 
                                                 
 2 Freeman, R. B. and R. Schettkat (2001), ‘Marketization of Production and the US-
Europe Employment Gap’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 63, Special Issue, pp 
647-670 and ‘Your Time or Your Money’, Economic Policy Conference, 2004. 
 3 Bielenski, H., G. Bosch and A. Wagner (2003), ‘Working Time Preferences in 
Sixteen European Countries’, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Work 
Conditions, www.eurofound.eu.int/publications/files/EF0207EN.pdf 
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enjoyed the fruits of economic growth to the extent that employed Europeans have. 
 Equally striking, EU labor markets have produced markedly lower dispersion of pay 
than the US labor market.  The lower level of dispersion cannot, moreover, be attributed to 
the greater variation in skills among Americans than Europeans.  This is most clearly seen in 
the 1998 International Adult Literacy Test (IALS) that the OECD organized across major 
OECD countries.  The IALS gave adults in the countries the same exam in their native 
language. Americans had a wider dispersion in exam scores than did Europeans, in part 
because of a sizable number of immigrants, many of whom spoke Spanish rather than 
English.  The surveys in some countries, including the US, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Germany, also gave the earnings of workers.  Consistent with other data sets, these data show 
that within narrowly defined skill groups, Americans have a much wider dispersion of 
earnings than the Europeans.  Most amazing, however, is the fact that the dispersion of 
earnings among Americans with effectively the same level of measured skill exceeded the 
dispersion of earnings among all workers in the European countries.4 
 Does the lower dispersion of earnings of persons with similar measured skills in the 
EU than in the US imply that EU labor markets have excessively narrowed the wage 
distribution or is it a sign of a failure of the “law of one price” in the US labor market?  In the 
US there are large differences in the earnings of seemingly similar workers across firms or 
establishments.  Workers earn more and gain larger increases in pay in more profitable firms 
or sectors. One interpretation of this is that there are huge differences in unobserved skills 
among workers that the US job market rewards but which EU job markets suppress.  The 
other interpretation is that the EU job market comes closer to the competitive ideal of a single 
price – that the US job market fails to reduce the effects of random luck, economic rents, 
discrimination, etc to the levels of the Invisible Hand ideal.  However one comes down on 
this (since the issue hinges on unobserved skills, it is difficult to get a scientific consensus) 
you can take this to the bank:  the dispersion of wages in the EU falls markedly below the 
dispersion of wages in the US. 
 
 
2.  Yes, Labor Market Institutions Differ 
 
Anyone who works or employs workers in the EU and in the US quickly realizes that there 
are great similarities and striking differences in the way labor market institutions operate in 
the two settings.  The similarities are that the EU and US operate under the rule of law, with 
substantial regulations of employers, freedom of association, and so on. The differences are 
also substantial.  Union density is higher in the EU, and even more important, collective 
bargaining coverage is far higher than density in the EU because many EU countries have 
mandated extension of collective contracts.  Over 75% of workers were covered by collective 
contracts in EU countries compared to 14% in the US.   
 Perhaps the greatest indication of the difference between EU and US markets is that 
the phrase “social partner” which the EU uses to describe the management and unions who 
deal regularly on economic issues has no counterpart in the US.  Mention social partner to 
Americans and people think of square dancing in Texas, not business and labor.  There are no 
                                                 
 4 The average standard deviation of log earnings of Americans who scored within four 
points of each other was 0.79 compared to a standard deviation of log earnings of 0.68 for the 
EU countries.  See Can Devroye and Richard Freeman, ‘Does Inequality in Skills Explain 
Inequality of Earnings Across Advanced Countries?’, NBER WP 8140, Feb 2001 Figure 3.    
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regular forums in which business and labor meet to discuss national problems.  When the two 
sides get together, it is more likely to push for protectionist legislation, as in steel, than to 
seek agreement about national problems.   
 The institutional differences between the US and EU countries can be measured in 
various ways.  The World Economic Forum’s 2002-2003 Global Competitiveness Report 
asked business persons four questions on labor practices in the US and EU countries that 
illustrate the differences. On the question of whether wages in your country are set by 
collective bargaining or were up to individual companies, the US scored 3rd out of 80 
countries in having wages set by companies compared to a 79th score for Germany, 78th for 
Finland, 76th for Ireland, with other EU countries save for the UK also scoring low on 
company and high on collective bargaining.  On a question about regulation of hiring and 
firing, the US scored 3rd in having decisions determined by employers compared to “impeded 
by regulations”, Germany was 79th, France 76th and again most other EU countries save for 
the UK were rated as high in regulation.  There was somewhat greater variability in responses 
on relation of pay and productivity, though again the US was rated highly (no 2) compared to 
44 for Germany.  Thus, in all of these measures the US was closer to the free market ideal.  
But many EU countries scored higher than the US in cooperation in labor management 
relations. Here Germany was 20th in terms of cooperative, the US 21st, and Denmark was 3rd, 
Austria 4th, Sweden 6th.  Italy and France rated very low.  
 At the workplace, the EU has the Social Charter, which provides for works councils in 
which elected representatives of workers confer with management over workplace issues. 
This institution is largely outlawed in the US as a company union. The EU also has stronger 
employment protection legislation than the US, which gives European workers greater 
ownership of their jobs.  In the US, the employer owns the job to the extent that the employer 
can bring in permanent replacements for striking employees.  The one area where US 
employment laws are more stringent than EU laws is in the option for court suits, which has 
led some US firms to insist that workers agree to forego their legal rights to going to court in 
favor of going to a company appointed arbitrator. 
 In short, the EU relies more on institutional wage setting and employment regulations 
than does the US.  Whether these institutions greatly affect the employment and wage 
differences noted above is by no means clear. Cantillon told the story of the rooster that cries 
cock-a-doodle doo every morning before the sun rises and believes that its crying rouses the 
sun.  Social partners may meet and talk and talk and meet but markets place great constraints 
on economic decisions.  Much of what social partners do may be more rooster rhetoric and 
show than reality.   The link between institutions and outcomes requires empirical analysis. 
 
 
3. So What is the Effect of EU Labor Market Institutions? 
 
It may seem obvious to critics of EU job markets that EU labor market institutions are the 
main cause of employment problems.  The argument has two parts: 
 
 more institutionalized markets –> lower wage dispersion/higher costs of employment 
 for low skill workers  
 the wage/cost interventions –> lower employment rates.   
 
 The evidence that EU wage setting institutions are a major cause of lower wage 
dispersion seems fairly strong.  Unions invariably seek to reduce wage differentials among 
similarly situated workers (outside of professional sports and entertainment) and reduce 
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managerial discretion in pay-setting.  Unions invariably seek to raise the pay of lower paid 
workers compared to higher paid workers.  No one has come up with an alternative 
explanation for the lower dispersion of pay in the EU than in the US.   
 It is less clear that EU institutions raise the cost of hiring workers relative to the cost 
in the US, though this is certainly plausible.  On the one side, because the US lacks national 
health insurance, employers pay health insurance for permanent workers, which creates an 
incentive to outsource work or favor additional hours to additional workers.  By contrast, 
health costs are covered by national taxes in EU countries. But EU employment protection 
legislation increases the cost of hiring workers by raising the cost of firing.  It is more 
expensive to hire and to fire, with uncertain effects on overall employment, though with a 
definite impact on the distribution of employment between those initially holding jobs (the 
25-54 year old men in Table 1) versus other groups.  On net, the effect on employment may 
be negative, but neither the economics arguments nor evidence are definitive. 
 The argument that has not fared well is that lower wage dispersion/higher costs of 
employment of low skill workers –> lower employment rates.  The 1994 OECD Jobs Study 
made an evidentiary case that wage interventions and inflexible institutions were at the heart 
of EU employment problems.  The evidence on which the OECD relied was largely time 
series or cross country comparisons based on limited observations and imperfect measures.  
In ensuing years the evidence has proven to be non-robust.  Add a few years, change the 
definition or model specification modestly and poof! it vanishes in a cloud of a large standard 
error.5   
 If you have strong priors, you can still hold to the Jobs Report view of the world, but 
your belief is just that – a belief based on priors rather than evidence.  American economists, 
aware that growth of employment and hours in the US has been concentrated among highly 
educated workers and among women workers, whose wages rose relative to others, have 
always found it hard to believe that wage compression at the bottom of the income 
distribution lay at the heart of EU jobs problems. The barely discernible impacts that US 
minimum wages have had on employment reinforces this suspicion.  
 When the US produced relatively more college graduates per young person than EU 
countries, it was plausible to argue that the EU labor market was not giving young people 
enough incentive to invest in higher education, with adverse effects on human capital 
investment. This in turn could have contributed to the lower employment rate in the EU due 
to the historically higher rates of employment among the more educated.   But without US 
levels of earnings dispersion and college/high school wage differentials, EU countries have 
greatly increased the proportion of young persons going to university.  Perhaps most 
important as an indicator of the future, in 1999 the EU produced more PhDs in science and 
engineering that did the US – for the first time since before World War II.  
                                                 
 5 Howell, D. (2004), Questioning Liberalization: Unemployment, Labor Markets, and the Welfare 
State, Oxford University Press (forthcoming) provides the most recent evidence, but the OECD Employment 
Outlooks in ensuing years told a more complex story than the Jobs Study as well. 
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 If a badly functioning EU labor market is not the prime cause of the EU-US 
employment gap, what is?  If I knew for certain I would rush to Frankfurt or Brussels or 
Berlin or Paris, or wherever the key decisions are made and shout the answer at officialdom 
until they cured matters.  My surmise is that a series of major institutional changes and policy 
errors – ranging from the unification of Germany at economically indefensible wage and 
currency valuations, to the currency union without accompanying institutional changes to 
conservative monetary policy lies at the heart of the problem.  Imagine if the US and EU had 
traded central bankers and central banking policies over the past decade or so.  Whose 
employment record would have looked better, at least over the nineties?   
 
 
4. EU Institutions and Outcomes Can be Improved  
 
The claim that EU labor institutions are not as awful as many critics of EU-style institutional 
arrangements make them out to be does not of course mean that the institutions and outcomes 
cannot be improved.  They can.  On the one side, policies that make it easier for women, 
particularly those with considerable education, to work full-time will go a long way to 
increasing the EU employment rate for a group with a very large gap compared to the US.  
These policies may include greater social support of child care, stronger equal opportunity 
laws, changes in school leaving hours, as well as changes in taxes, and in immigration laws.  
Given its aging population and the improved health of the elderly, Europe needs to change 
pension policies and to consider new policies on immigration.  Perhaps more EU countries 
should adopt policies to encourage more child-bearing, as some countries such as the French 
and Swedes have done. Experiments with unemployment insurance countries suggest that 
greater pressure/assistance to the unemployed to find jobs can reduce the length of time 
people spend unemployed.  The Nordic policy of tying social benefits to work has clear 
advantages over forms of social welfare that make non-work more attractive.   
 There is one area in which the EU job market performs so differently than the US job 
market as to seem from another world.  Americans think nothing of moving from Atlanta to 
San Francisco, or from St. Louis to Boston for a job.  Despite the absence of any institutional 
rigidities, Europeans tend to cluster in their own countries, in some cases in their native cities, 
for work.  Greater geographic mobility would ease European employment problems, 
particularly among countries with the common currency.  Politicians who lose jobs in 
London, Paris, Berlin, seem to find full employment by migrating to Brussels.  Workers 
could surely reduce spells of unemployment if they showed similar mobility.  But low 
mobility cannot be readily blamed on labor institutions, which have become increasingly 
friendly to migration within the EU.   
 In sum, EU labor markets are imperfect institutions.  They are imperfect in different 
ways than US labor markets and are imperfect in different ways than other economic 
institutions.  But they are not the monster at the end of the book, the villain in the movie, the 
prime cause of EU employment problems.  Not as awful as all that. 
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Table 1:  Employment to Population Rates, EU vs US, 2002, by Education for Persons 
Aged 25-34 and for Persons 15-24 and 55-64 
 
  Men Women 
  EU US Gap EU US Gap 
All, aged 15-64 72.9 78.0 -5.1 55.7 66.1 -10.7 
15-24 43.7 57.1 -13.4 37.2 54.3 -17.1 
25-54 86.7 86.6 0.1 67.3 72.3 -5.0 
55-64 50.5 66.3 -15.8 31.0 53.2 -22.2 
Aged 25-64       
 Less than 2ndary 71.0 69.8 1.2 40.5 47.1 -6.6 
 2ndary 81.7 82.1 -0.4 66.8 70.6 -3.8 
 Tertiary 88.3 89.9 -1.6 79.8 79.1 0.7 
 
Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook, 2003, tables B, C and D. 
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